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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to show the justification and importance of explicit inclusion 
of quality of governance in the debate on economic growth in Croatia.  Governance is defined 
as the manner in which the state employs its power in handling the institutional environment, 
thus affecting the accumulation of economic growth factors. Although there are numerous el-
ements in the quality of governance, this paper places the emphasis on the whole on two of 
them: the rule of law and the quality of the public administration.  In pursuit of its objective, 
the paper first of all considers the links between governance and economic growth in growth 
theory and empirical research to date. After that an econometric (panel) analysis of quality 
of governance and economic growth on a sample of EU countries and Croatia, Bulgaria and 
Romania (EU accession candidate countries) is performed, and then changes in the quality of 
governance in Croatia are considered.  From a comparison of the values of indicators of the 
rule of law and quality of the public administration, and the dynamics and nature of reform in 
the administration of justice and the civil service, it appears that those in whom power is vest-
ed in Croatia are more focused on rent-seeking than is the case in the average of EU countries. 
Institutional shortcomings have affected the current level of real per capita GDP in Croatia, 
and more rapid and effective reforms of the justice and public administration sectors, as well 
as fighting corruption and boosting democracy (as mechanism for controlling those in whom 
power is vested) would have a positive effect on future economic growth.
Key words: governance, economic growth, Croatia, rule of law, public administration
ARTICLES
* The writer gratefully acknowledges the very useful comments of Professor Vojmir Franičević, Professor Steve 
Pejovich and the three anonymous peer reviewers and takes all responsibility for any errors there still might be.
**  Received: May 27, 2005.
Accepted: December 12, 2005.
280
M. Bađun: The Quality of Governance and Economic Growth in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 29 (4), 279-308 (2005)
1 Introduction
In previous investigations of the quality of governance1 in Croatia it was established 
that according to indicators of the rule of law and quality of the public administration, 
Croatia considerably lags behind the EU-15 average, and also behind the new members 
of the EU,2 though in this case there is a somewhat smaller gap (Ott, 2004). The World 
Bank (2003) identified poorly defined laws protecting property and creditors and the poor 
functioning of the justice system as the main obstacles in the way of a rapid and sustain-
able growth for Croatia. For the removal of these obstacles, legal reforms and, still more 
importantly, effective reform of the public administration are required. In 2003, the EBRD 
also accorded prime position, within the key reforms in Croatia, as well as in Bulgaria and 
Romania, to the strengthening of the capacity of the public administration and increas-
ing the effectiveness of the judiciary so as to create a propitious economic environment. 
The frequent mention of the rule of law and the quality of the public administration by 
international organisations is very understandable, for these two areas have been shown 
to be the basic weaknesses in the institutional development of the transitional countries 
(Shleifer, 1997; Murrel, 2002).
In spite of criticisms of international organisations, which might be said to have ar-
rived later than they should have,3 it would seem that the authorities in Croatia do not un-
derstand fully quite how much institutional weaknesses have affected the current size of 
real per capita GDP in Croatia, and what the results of failure to carry out the said reforms 
on future economic development might be. The objective of this paper is to show that it 
is reasonable and important explicitly to introduce the quality of governance into the de-
bate on the economic growth of Croatia. Here we shall define governance as the manner 
in which government uses its power in the management of the institutional environment, 
hence affecting the accumulation of the factors of economic growth.4 In accordance with 
this, good governance will be considered the kind of governance that contributes to eco-
nomic growth. Although there are numerous elements that together constitute quality of 
governance, in this work particular emphasis will be placed on two of them: the rule of 
law and the quality of the public administration, for the reasons already cited. The rule 
of law in the paper means a system in which all citizens are equal before the law and in 
which every breach of the law is consistently sanctioned. Good public administration is 
considered the kind of public administration that is effective in the obviation of barriers 
in the way of enterprise and investment (a low degree of bureaucratisation),5 the officers 
of which do not abuse their power for the sake of private benefit (the absence of corrup-
1  When in economic literature governance is mentioned, the reference is often to corporate governance. In this 
work however, public governance is meant.
2 The paper does not take into consideration Cyprus and Malta, but only the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
3 The delay is related to the shortcomings of the Washington consensus (v. e.g., Ahrens and Meurers, 2000)
4 Institutions represent the rules of the game in society, the human-created constraints, that shape their interacti-
on and give the structure to incentives in exchange (North, 1994:360)
5 The bureaucracy in this context has a negative connotation and relates to unnecessarily complications and to 
sluggishness in the performance of tasks, to the huge amount of procedures and the absence of information.
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tion). It is clear that there are other criteria as well according to which the quality of pub-
lic administration might be evaluated, but they are not the subject of this paper.
At the very beginning of the paper we shall consider the link between governance 
and economic growth in the theory of growth and in empirical research to date. After that 
we shall carry out an econometric analysis of the quality of governance and economic 
growth using a sample of EU countries, and Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania (all EU can-
didates), and then shall consider how fast changes in the quality of governance are occur-
ring, and the nature of these changes. According to this we shall be able to evaluate how 
much those in whom power is vested in Croatia are focused on their own benefits, and 
how much on the creation of a growth-incentivising environment.
2 Governance and economic growth
Throughout history there have been numerous attempts to set economic growth mov-
ing, but only a few of them have actually succeeded. Seeking the most frequent common 
denominator of all examples of the frustration of growth the historian Jones noticed that 
this was the universally existing aspiration towards rent-seeking, i.e., the use of politi-
cal means, and indeed of violence, “to take more out of the kitty than would be justified 
by one’s own contribution” (Jones, 2003:XXXV). When this is joined to North’s claim 
(1990:107) that institutions are the basic determinant of the long-term high performance 
of an economy, then the importance of the quality of governance in economic growth, es-
pecially over the long term, can be discerned.
2.1 Governance and theoretical models of growth 
Although governance did exist in descriptive studies of economic growth and in par-
ticular in the domain of economic history, it has been neglected in the standard growth 
models. The Solow model for example, is grounded on numerous assumptions, one of 
them being that property rights are secure. Thus the main deficiency of this model from 
the standpoint of governance is that it does not take into account any shortcomings in the 
quality of governance, assuming that they do not exist. Although the so-called neoclas-
sical models of growth are still current in economics and although they have explained a 
great deal in the mechanism of growth, they still do not give a fundamental explanation 
of it (Acemoglu et al., 2004:1). The issue that the Solow model has not addressed is why 
in some countries individuals invest more in physical and human capital, or why they in-
vest more resources into innovation than in some other countries. 
The currently leading hypothesis (within the new theory of growth) explaining dif-
ferences in GDP characteristics among countries relates to social infrastructure, a concept 
similar to governance.6 Hall and Jones (1999) take social infrastructure to be the institu-
6 The difference in the signifier comes from different researchers at almost the same time having found in existing 
models of growth the same shortcoming and then called it by different names. Social infrastructure is a concept that 
appears in macroe conomic textbooks, and public governance is mentioned in very many empirical investigations, par-
ticularly in those spurred by the World Bank. It is important to mention that this work, in defining public governance, 
or governance per se, stresses the government as the primary factor creating the business and investment environments. 
Thus social infrastructure is actually a broader concept than governance, for it also includes informal networks.
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tions and government policy that encourage investment and production, and not consump-
tion and rent-seeking.7 By the creation of appropriate institutions, the government reduces 
uncertainty and transaction costs, thus enlarging trade efficiency, encouraging specialisa-
tion and incentivising investment in physical and human capital and ideas. Naturally, it is 
precisely this power of creating and carrying out laws that enables the government itself 
to become the main agent in rent-seeking.
Social infrastructure, like quality of governance, can also affect the form of invest-
ment that is undertaken. For example, in an environment with insecure property rights it 
is more profitable to invest in trade than in some innovative long-term projects involv-
ing the slow accumulation of capital. Similarly, if the danger of being penalised for tak-
ing bribes in the administration is nugatory, individuals will endeavour to acquire skills 
enabling them to obtain employment in the civil service rather than knowledge that will 
advance production.
Unfortunately, no well-elaborated theoretical model of growth including governance 
or even social infrastructure as integrated concepts exists. Instead of that, intuition and 
historical experience tend to prevail, and from these stems empirical research.
2.2 Empirical findings
Until very recently it was considered impossible econometrically to confirm the hy-
pothesis that quality of governance affects economic growth for “institutions cannot be 
seen, felt, touched or measured” (North 1990:107). Since quality of governance has at the 
theoretical and political levels become an increasingly acknowledged determinant of the 
magnitude and rate of growth of GDP, so the number of investigations of the topic have 
increased. Their popularity has been enhanced by the expanding availability of informa-
tion for many of the dimensions of governance. In econometric research there has been 
an endeavour to find various factors incentivising investment in physical and human cap-
ital, and research and development expenditure, or quite simply attempts have been made 
to explain economic growth without devoting too much attention to the channels through 
which it was effectuated. A great part of the research directly mentions governance, and 
in others it is seen through the institutions. However, there is no work covering all the di-
mensions of governance, each author concentrating rather on just a few of them. Mention 
is most often made of the rule of law, protection of property rights, effectiveness/quali-
ty of the civil service, corruption, democracy, political stability and the magnitude of ad-
ministrative obstacles.
The findings of such investigations might be summed up in a few points:
•  there is a positive correlation among many of the elements of quality of governance 
and long-term rates of growth in GDP (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Ro-
drik, 1997; Evans and Rauch, 1999; and so on);
•  poor governance is a characteristic of countries that have low levels of real per capita 
GDP (Hall and Jones, 1999; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2004);
7  Rent-seeking can be defined as a reallocation of property rights via political intervention, and not as market 
competition (Kasper and Streit, 1998:39). Politicians and public servants, like all other people, tend to follow their 
own interests, which do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the electorate.
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•  growth can be generated without major institutional changes (Glaser et al., 2004) 
but good institutions are necessary for the maintenance of long-term rates of growth 
(Rodrik, 2004);
•  improved governance is not an automatic side-effect of a country’s increased wealth 
(Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002);
•  the marginal contribution of institutional improvements is greater in transitional 
countries (Moers, 1999);
•  the rule of law is the most important quality of governance for growth in the transi-
tional countries (Campos, 2000).
•  Objections to econometric research into the quality of governance and econom-
ic growth are largely related to the data used in it. Among such critiques, mention 
might be made of:
•  the data are imprecise and subjective because there are no direct measures of gov-
ernance;
•  it is not always possible to determine how well they distinguish between percep-
tions of poor institutions and poor economic performance;
•  many indicators describe the economic environment for foreigners better than for 
domestic investors, since they are actually designed for them in the first place;
•  the existing indicators do not reflect any permanent characteristics of institutions, 
being rather the results of politics in the country in the immediately preceding pe-
riod;
•  very broad measurements are made of some of the dimensions of governance;
•  in connection with commercial agencies such as Political Risk Services,8 the trans-
parency of index formation is fairly low – the methodological value of such items 
is dubious for nowhere is there any indication of the principles according to which 
the consultants forming the index for some country are chosen.
In spite of these criticisms, especially those that relate to subjectivity, it is a fact that 
there are commercial agencies that make very good earnings by selling indicators of gov-
ernance quality, which means that they must be giving useful information to potential in-
vestors. It can also be said that in a democratic society perceptions are fairly important. 
For an investor, the sense of security provided by the existence of some law is of consid-
erable importance; subjective indicators evaluate how much formal institutions are ap-
plied in reality.9 In recent times aggregate indicators have frequently been used based on 
several sources and hence are so much the better. Of the actual indicators, though, a more 
important issue is causality, i.e., feedback of growth on institutions, which still has not 
8 Political Risk Services (2005) publishes its International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which contains nume-
rous indicators of the quality of governance. It is interesting to see that the price of the ICRG, with its monthly upda-
tes, comes to $4,595 p.a.
9 In some future research it would be necessary to see if sensitivity to institutional shortcomings increase in 
parallel with economic development and whether this in turn affects subjective governance quality indicators. Also 
needing to be investigated is whether after all some peoples are more pessimistic than others, and how much perce-
ptions differ from reality. 
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been satisfactorily handled. It is not desirable facilely to conclude that institutions cause 
growth, rather it is better to say that they facilitate it. Among other drawbacks of existing 
investigations, we would foreground the following:
•  the problem of multicolinearity;
•  the connection between governance and growth may not always be linear and yet 
in the models this is always assumed;
•  as for comparison with “similar” countries, the criteria cannot be only per capita 
GDP, but certain other factors, such as dependence on trade, geographical position, 
cultural and historical inheritance;
•  the assumption that the same regression models work for rich and poor counties is 
on the whole inaccurate (a problem known as parameter heterogeneity);
•  insufficient attention is given to other independent variables that are included in the 
model, which can considerably affect the results – it is necessary to vary the control 
variables and only then to draw conclusions;
•  it may happen that precisely those variables that are explained by both GDP and in-
stitutions are excluded, in which case an apparent regression arises;
•  researchers who have observed short periods of time have tended to ignore cycli-
cal trends in GDP.
Although the criticisms are numerous, it would be unreasonable a priori to reject 
econometrics in the investigation of economic growth, for it provides new solutions year 
after year, the data are improved, and in addition econometrics draws attention to poten-
tially interesting relations of the variables, which then need to be interpreted.10 In spite 
of that, it would still be desirable to supplement econometric studies with the analysis of 
individual economies and additional researches by political and social scientists and in-
stitutional economists – of all, in fact, who are interested in the area. In line with this, the 
current paper will first of all carry out an econometric analysis, and after that will con-
centrate on an individual economy – the Croatian.
3 Econometric analysis of the quality of governance and economic growth
In all the countries of CE Europe and in the Baltic lands, the transition to a market 
economy led to an initial decline, sometimes dramatic, in real per capita GDP, and by 2001, 
not all the countries had regained the level of 1990.11 Among such countries was Croatia. 
The question is very reasonably asked why some transitional countries developed more 
rapidly than the others when all went through a similar process of reform: the stabilisa-
tion of the economy, market liberalisation and privatisation.
10 In connection with a comment attributed to George Box might be quoted: all models are wrong, but some are 
useful (Kennedy, 2003:81). Theil (1971:VI) wrote that models should be applied but need not be believed.
11 The year 2001 is mentioned since this is the last year in which there are available GDP data in international 
Gheary-Kamis 1990dollars. The international dollar was created in order to increase the comparability of data from 
national accounts. The relative prices of a particular good in a country are equated with the weighted average price of 
the good in all countries (117 of them), or with the international price. This level of prices is then standardised so that 
the level of the USA GDP in American dollars is equivalent to that in international dollars.
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The institutional vacuum that ensued after the fall of socialism was at the point of 
origin of the successes and failures of economic reforms (Campos, 2000). It was shown 
that at the beginning of the transition the minimum institutions for the development of 
the market that would restrict unwanted forms of human conduct and reduce insecurity 
had to exist. Transition brought with it a set of exogenous shocks that gave greater power 
to certain groups in society, and their ability to organise depended on the institutions that 
happened to exist at the time. Institutional deficit, the deficiency in institutional legitima-
cy and the poor application of formal rules (Franičević, 2001) left plenty of room to head 
officials and public servants towards the following objective: grabbing as much as possi-
ble while they still could (Schleifer, 1997:404). The transition confirmed political theo-
ries on the development of institutions:12 institutions are given their shape by those who 
are in power so that they can stay in power and funnel resources towards themselves. Of 
course, the transitional countries do differ among themselves, and hence the process of 
rent-seeking cannot be equally powerful in all countries, which could have affected the 
differences in their economic performance.
Fines of econometric investigations already carried out and mentioned show that there 
is a statistically significant correlation between quality of governance and rate of growth 
and level of real per capita GDP. Here the goal is to check out these results on an EU-1413 
and 11 transition country (eight new members14 and three candidates) sample. It should be 
said at once that economists’ debates about growth usually concern GDP long-term growth. 
In the case of the transition countries, however, this is concerned with short-term per capita 
GDP (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). Perhaps in the case of the transition countries, because 
of the short time series, the link between governance and business cycles should be consid-
ered, but this well be left for some future investigation. The incentives affecting the size of 
savings, investment and technological progress do not differ greatly according to the time 
period that is analysed, especially when these stimuli refer to the institutional structure.
It was only at the end of the 1990s that institutions were brought into econometric 
investigations of growth in the transitional countries, and then with the problems stated. 
When the transitional counties are in the sample, they become even more complex.15 For 
12 For a classification of the theory of the development of institutions, see La Porta et al. (1999).
13 Luxembourg has an atypical value of real p.c. GDP, and it will be omitted.
14 It might be said that the new members have already completed the transition. Yet they will be considered 
transitional here because they entered the EU only in 2004, while the data series that we are going to use here was 
completed in 2001.
15 Croatia itself has to date been included into only four investigations of governance and growth: Ahrens and 
Meurers (2000), Campos (2000), Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2003) and Beck and Laeven (2005). The first showed a 
greater correlation between governance and p.c. FDI than with p.c. GDP; in the second the link between the rule of 
law with levels and rates of growth of p.c. GDP was shown; the third indicated that the influence of institutions in the 
growth of the transitional countries was relatively small, while the fourth had just the opposite conclusion: instituti-
ons have had a considerable effect on the growth of the transitional countries. Most often mentioned is the work of 
Havrylyshyna and Rooden (2003), but there are many shortcomings to it: a) it has an index of economic freedoms as 
measure of institutions, and it actually includes various evaluations of trade, taxation, wages, prices, fiscal policy and 
so on – institutions are defined fairly inaccurately; b) the correlation between institutional indicators that were used in 
the growth equation is very high, which is a little suspect, for there are legal, economic and political institutions (this 
perhaps indicates the excessive subjectivity of the institutional indicators used); c) the authors did not take into acco-
unt the effects of liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation being different with respect to the different institutional 
backgrounds; d) institutional indicators relate to 1997, and they are used to measure growth from 1991 to 1998.
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every investigation covering the transition countries is from the outset restricted not only 
because of the short time span for which data are available but also because the countries 
did not have the same tempo for carrying out reforms. Accordingly, these countries might 
have had different models of growth. As well as the standard shortcomings of indicators 
of quality of governance, in the transition countries the reliability of the size of GDP is 
also dubious, because of the very large unofficial economy.
The investigations include a quandary as to whether the dependent variable in the 
economic growth empirical analysis should be the rate or the level of growth. Most 
researchers to date have used the average rate of growth in real GDP during a peri-
od of 15 and more years as the independent variable, but in this paper, because of the 
brevity of the period of time observed and the great structural changes through which 
the transition countries went, we shall observe the per capita level of GDP and not the 
rate of growth.16 It is unsure whether only one equation or two should be employed for 
growth (one of which has investment as the dependent variable) because high growth 
in a short period of time can increase the demand for investment. Most often only one 
equation is used, and we shall act accordingly in this paper as well. Even if the ex-
tent of the effect of investment (especially foreign investment) on growth in the tran-
sition countries is questionable, the fact remains that governance will affect both to-
tally productivity of growth factors and investment in human capital, which is often 
left out of the analysis.
The question arises as to which is the best way to carry out the econometric anal-
ysis. Since aggregate indicators of quality of governance for Croatia have existed only 
since 1995, and since the last available GDP per capita in international 1990 dollars is for 
2001, an analysis of a time series is clearly not a good approach.17 Cross-country analysis 
for a single period is also not acceptable for all told this is a matter of 25 countries, that 
should very probably be divided into two groups (the EU 14 and the transitional coun-
tries) which result in too small a number of observations. Instead of that, we shall carry 
out a panel analysis, via a model with fixed effects, which is recommended when the 
units under observation are countries (Wooldridge, 2002:473), which is confirmed by the 
Hausman test as well.18
16 Hall and Jones (1999) also urged an analysis of levels of p.c. GDP, for the rates are anyway studied because 
they have an impact on the levels.
17 This work will use aggregate indicators because they are founded on several sources and better picture the 
real state of things. For example, it is a bit strange that the indicator of the protection of property rights of the Heri-
tage Foundation (2005) for Croatia did not change at all between 1997 and 2005. The same holds true for the admi-
nistrative hurdles in starting companies.
18 The fixed effects model partially settles the problem of heterogeneity of parameters, but it should be borne in 
mind that this problem is characteristic of all social research. A panel analysis gives a greater insight into the dyna-
mic effects of institutional changes, which can be large even in the short run; this is not possible with cross-country 
analyses, for averages for a certain longer period of time are used. The advantage here is that it is better for solving 
problems of omitted variables that change inconsiderably over time (such as, for example, geographical position), 
but it does not solve the issue of business cycles within the observed period of time. In previous panel analyses data 
are mainly grouped into five-year averages (Islam, 1995), which is supposed to suit business cycles better, but this 
seems dubious. Unfortunately, in this paper, the period of observation is too short for grouping into averages longer 
than two years (1995/96, 1997/98, 1999/00 and 2001/02). Grouping will be carried out primarily because the avai-
lable aggregate indicators of quality of governance relate to the two-year average. For the last group, p.c. GDP figu-
res are available only for 2001.
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The initial linear regression model that we wish to evaluate is:
log yit = αit + βi x´it + εit ,  (1)
for the units observed (the countries) i = 1, 2… N, in which N = 25, and the time pe-
riod is t = 1, 2…, T. Since a fixed effects model has been selected, α will differ for each 
country of the sample, or αit = αi ; this parameter is a constant specific for a given coun-
try. Panel analysis gives the possibility of choosing whether β will be assessed for each 
country separately or for the whole sample, here we shall choose a β in common because 
of the greater credibility of the results (a larger number of observations when all the coun-
tries are observed), with the proviso that β will also be assessed for two sub-groups of 
countries: the EU 14 and the 11 transition countries. Meanwhile, xit   is the k-dimension-
al transposed vector that will represent the indicators of the rule of law and the quality of 
the public administration, and εit is an error term.19 We shall evaluate the parameters with 
the weighted least squares method (GLS), and in order to remove the effect of the con-
stant factors on the dependent variable, each variable will be differenced through time 
(Wooldridge, 2002). The difference is nothing but a change in the value of the variable 
(∆) between the two periods.
The most important limiting element of this investigation is that governance is con-
sidered to be an exogenous variable, that is, the feedback effect of economic growth on 
the quality of governance will not be taken into consideration. Although it is hard to de-
fine the size of this feedback effect, for the moment available estimates suggest that it is 
minimal in the short term (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005).20 Since institutions 
impact growth, and growth impacts institutions, there must be some third factors that have 
an effect on both growth and institutions, for the discovery of which research work from 
psychologists and sociologists is required.21 In the sequel we give an analysis of the rela-
tion between the rule of law and the quality of governance and economic growth.
3.1 The rule of law and economic growth
The definition of the rule of law in this paper focuses on the role of the judiciary. It 
is double: above all it is the protection of the rights and liberties of the citizens that en-
19 Since the correlation among various indicators of governance quality is very high, we shall not put them into the 
same equation in order to avoid the problem of multicolinearity. Here k indicates a number of independent variables. 
20 Works in which a strong influence of governance on p.c. GDP are adduced are for example: Hall and Jones 
(1999), Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2004), Rodrik et al. (2004). For an opposite opinion, see Sachs 
et al. (2004).
21 Probably some reader might hold its simplicity against the model used in this work, primarily because of 
the exclusion of control variables that relate to economic policy. However, Acemoglu et al. (2003) have shown that 
countries with bad macroeconomic policy (high inflation, high budgetary deficits, a misaligned exchange rate) have 
at the same time weak institutions (lack of protection for the rights of investors, widespread corruption, an insuffici-
ently controlled political elite). In other words, macroeconomic problems are a reflection of institutional problems. 
Unfortunately, the issue of quality of governance and economic growth is too complex to be shown with an elegant 
theoretical model, but at the same time there are too many obstacles for it to be based only on econometrics. For this 
reason, in this paper, there is an effort to approach the relation between quality of governance and economic gro-
wth from several sides, which can leave an impression of superficiality for the space for analysis is restricted by the 
length requirements for the article.
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sure them equality before the law, and the second part is that it has to supervise the leg-
islative and executive arms of government. If the courts do not protect rights of property, 
do not enforce contracts and do not resolve disputes in good time then the motivation for 
investment and innovation is reduced, that is, the incentives for productive activities are 
lowered, and those for rent-seeking are enlarged. Similarly, if the courts are corrupt, this 
will indicate that citizens are not all equal before the law, for equity in the sense of “to 
each his deserts” is confounded. A justice system that is corrupt or politically dependent 
can facilitate high-level corruption and weaken reforms, affecting economic growth (Feld 
and Voigt, 2003). Failure to respect the rule of law brings about a fall in the confidence in 
justice, and respect for the justice system, in turn, can be correlated with the level of in-
vestment (World Bank, 1997:36)
Data from the research of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) contain aggregat-
ed indicators of the rule of law. They are used to estimate how much the rules of society 
are respected, and include (citizens’, investors’ and analysts’) perceptions of the dissem-
ination of crime, the effectiveness of the courts and the enforcement of contracts. They 
range from -2.5 to +2.5, a large number indicating better performance.22 The shortcom-
ing of this indicator is that it contains relatively large measurement errors (as compared 
with the range of the indicator) for it is based on perceptions and because the individual 
indices that were employed in the aggregation did not perhaps characterize very well the 
concept that it was wished to quantify. The problem here is that a large number of sourc-
es was employed, in which in various ways the working of the rule of law was evaluat-
ed, and no very strict selection was made at the same time. It is not good to apply it to the 
monitoring of global trends in institutional development because during the aggregation 
the starting point was that the mean value of a global indicator in each period is the same, 
but it can show very well the relative position of a country as compared with the global 
average (of about 200 countries), even over time. The Croatian indicator is much lower 
than that for the EU 15; Croatia also lags behind the new members, and is in front only of 
Bulgaria and Romania.23 The only positive thing is that this difference is reducing.
With the use of this indicator for the rule of law and Maddison’s data about real per 
capita GDP in constant 1990 international dollars (Maddison, 2005) the following statis-
tically significant results at the 1% level are obtained: if the indicator of the rule of law is 
greater than 1, then ∆log y  will be increased by 0.067982, or real per capita GDP will go 
up by 7.03% [(e0,067982-1)x100], which goes for 25 countries of the sample (adjusted R2 = 
0.83). For the EU 14 growth is 4.28% (adjusted R2 = 0.91); for the 11 transitional coun-
tries it is 15.04% (adjusted R2 = 0.80).24 Since the growth of indicators of the rule of law 
22 Values of from -2.5 to 2.5 are weighted average scores for each country that have been rescaled into common 
units. The weightings are proportional to the precision of the data of the sources used, and the precision depends on 
how strong the correlation between the individual sources is.
23 In this work the last indicator for the rule of law used is information for 2001/2002, for the available p.c. 
GDP in international dollars sequence from 1990 ended in 2001. However, there is an item for 2003/2004, according 
to which the score for the rule of law in Croatia is a little worse than two years earlier (Kaufmann et al., 2005). The 
paper does not quote the table with the figures for all of the countries from the sample, for a graphic presentation is 
to be found in Bađun (2004).
24 Tables containing constants for each country and other econometric results are given in the Annex (Tables 
I, II and III).
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by 1 sounds rather abstract, taking the example of Croatia it would mean attaining the 
level of the rule of law that pertains in, for example, Spain, which would in turn mean a 
rise in the growth of real GDP per capita by 15.04%. Such percentages have to be used 
with great circumspection because of the numerous constraints, but two things are very 
certainly visible from them. Firstly, countries can benefit by improving the quality of gov-
ernance, and in a short period at that; secondly, the effect of the quality of governance on 
growth is greater in the transition countries than it is in the old member states of the EU.
3.2 Quality of public administration and economic growth
In the context of quality of the public administration or civil service we shall con-
sider the relation between corruption-cum-the degree of bureaucratisation and econom-
ic growth.
There is increasing empirical evidence that corruption has a negative impact on eco-
nomic growth; countries with widespread corruption have lower levels and rates of GDP 
growth (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder, 1997). 
Possible channels through which corruption has its effect on the reduction of economic 
growth are lower foreign and domestic investment,25 the targeting of government spend-
ing towards less effective projects that enable the more frequent pocketing of bribes, i.e., 
the reduction of the productivity of public investment, but not the proportion of GDP that 
they constitute (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 2002). Even when corruption 
and economic growth do coexist, corruption brings in costs and distortions in the alloca-
tion of resources.26 In corrupt states, the incentives that exist will tend to induce the most 
talented individuals to activities maximising the benefits from corruption, which can also 
have negative consequences to growth.
When corruption is at issue, it is difficult to make comparative analyses based on firm 
evidence because the number of cases of corruption that actually come before the courts 
can tell more about the justice system than about the real spread of corruption. Instead 
of that, use is made of various indices showing the perception of corruption. Among the 
aggregate indicators of World Bank researchers (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003) 
there is an indicator of the spread of corruption the range of which also moves between -
2.5 and +2.5. According to this indicator, Croatia lags considerably behind the EU 15 and 
the new members, its result being better only than those of Bulgaria and Romania.27
The procedure for econometric analysis is identical to that in the case of the rule of 
law, except that the dependent variable is set as the indicator of the extent of corruption. 
25 Private investment in conditions of widespread corruption is lower, because this works as a kind of tax upon 
investors, or as an extra cost, and also as insecurity.
26 Italy can be adduced as an example, that is, the differences between the north and the south. Italy is often 
given as an example of a country in which corruption and growth manage to coexist, but sight is lost of what Itali-
an p.c. GDP might be if there were less corruption. It is possible that corruption in Italy is internalised, in the sense 
that bribes are felt as just another tax, and hence the uncertainties and risks to investors are lower than in a country in 
which corruption is equally widespread, but in which the outcomes and effects of the payment of bribes are less cer-
tain. This, of course, is mere speculation, which would need to be verified.
27 As with the rule of law, indicators for the spread of corruption from Kaufmann et al. (2005) deteriorated in 
the period from 2001/2002 to 2003/2004.
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If the value of this variable increases by 1, then for the 25 countries, real GDP will rise by 
0.69% (adjusted R2 = 0.76); for the EU 14 no statistically significant correlation has been 
established, and in the case of the transition countries the rise will be 7.31% (adjusted  = 
0.85).28 In the case of Croatia, the situation would be as follows: if perceptions concern-
ing corruption changed enough for them to be similar to those in Portugal, real per capi-
ta GDP would rise by about 7%. From these results it can be assumed that the impact of 
corruption on per capita GDP in the transition countries is greater than in the EU 14. It 
is interesting also that the results of the authors of previous investigations are confirmed, 
according to which the effect of the rule of law on per capita GDP is greater than the im-
pact of corruption. This can be explained by corruption deriving from failure to respect the 
rule of law, where the rule of law is a more powerful factor impacting economic growth. 
The second explanation might be that investors simply perceive failure to respect the rule 
of law as a greater obstacle than corruption.
It is possible to observe indirectly through corruption the correlation between degree 
of bureaucratisation and economic growth.29 For complicated and lengthy administrative 
procedures form part of the growth of important disincentives for potential investors, 
particularly foreign investors. A high degree of bureaucratisation may drive away inves-
tors irrespective of the existence of generous incentives and sound legal security. Since 
time is money, investors will be ready to pay to avoid any delays during entry into the 
market or during business operations.30 As against this, the existence of rules and vari-
ous procedures that the potential investor might have to go through gives the civil serv-
ant a monopoly power – they can deny the issue of a license or delay its production for 
several months (Tanzi, 1998:566). This is how they are able to use their power for the 
demand for bribes. Bribes can also have an influence on the order in which an inves-
tor will obtained certain authorisations. All of this has a demotivating effect on start-ups 
(and new firms can generate new investment) and can push the activity into the unoffi-
cial economy. 
When an enterprise has a plan and wants to put it into operation, it will first of all 
come up short against the administrative and legal procedures that it has to go through 
to be registered, i.e., to set up the company. The World Bank has created its database 
called Doing Business (2005a) in which there is information about the existing pro-
cedures for incorporating a company, as well as information about the minimum pe-
riod of waiting and the costs of incorporation.31 Table 1 would suggest that the proce-
28 Tables with results of econometric analysis are given in the Annex (Tables IV, V and VI).
29 Unluckily, there are no appropriate data for a panel analysis of the direct relation between bureaucratisati-
on and economic growth.
30 Once it was considered that corruption might even favour development, because it speeds up certain procedu-
res (Leff, 1964), but acceleration of procedures is not a good enough argument for the toleration of corruption.
31 Procedures include the applications that relate to future taxation, labour force, safety at work, satisfactory eco-
logical criteria and all the other conditions that a firm has to satisfy before starting to operate lawfully. A firm that an 
entrepreneur wishes to firm is standardised and so there are those of up to 50 employees, initial capital that is 10 times 
greater than the p.c. GDP of the economy, 100% domestic owned, will operated in the most populated area, will deal 
with production or commerce, will not receive any special privileges or tax breaks and so on. Certain assumptions that 
relate to the standardised firm reduce the complexity of starting a company, for it is certainly not the same to start a 
business in Zagreb or in some small city. The methodology of the research is developed in Djankov et al. (2002).
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dure for registering an enterprise in Croatia is not very long, complicated or expen-
sive as compared with the EU 14 average, but these data do not tell very much about 
the real situation because they do not contain the bureaucratic delays in the civil serv-
ice, the hold-ups in the commercial courts, or the time necessary to get hooked up to 
the utility infrastructure or the time that an entrepreneur will lose while he or she tries 
to find information about how to start the firm. Even without the bureaucratic delays, 
49 days seems a lot compared with the five in Denmark, and 12 procedures exces-
sive as against the three in Sweden. Twelve procedures is at the same time more than 
in the other transition countries. From Table 1 it can be seen that the less developed 
EU countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) also have longer procedures for founding 
companies. It is interesting to see that the indicators for Romania are more positive 
than those for Croatian and Bulgaria, even than for the EU average. Perhaps this is the 
consequence of the introduction of the “tacit approval procedure” in May 2003; if the 
public administration in Romania does not give a firm an answer to an application for 
some permission in a period of 30 days, it is deemed that the authorisation has been 
issued (EBRD, 2003:181). 
The research of Djankov et al. (2002) had already shown from a sample of 85 coun-
tries in 1999 that in countries in which it is harder to start an enterprise (measured by 
number of procedures, minimum amount of time required for incorporation and regis-
tration as well as the costs of starting) corruption is more widespread and the unofficial 
economy is larger. It was also shown that the administrative hurdles are fewer in coun-
tries in which there are greater constraints on executive government and greater politi-
cal rights, even when per capita GDP is included as independent variable.32 Their results 
show that the purpose of the hurdles is to extract rent: those who have the greatest ben-
efit from them are officials and lower grade civil servants. Countries that have fewer po-
litical rights and less control over government will thus have a greater number of admin-
istrative hoops to jump through.
This investigation relates to data from 1999, and when the data from 2005 are ap-
plied, then the simple linear correlation coefficient between number of procedures and 
the CPI2005 indicator (Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Table 
1) comes to -0.71 for the EU-14 and -0.28 for the transition countries, and overall it is -
0.57. The first indicator reveals a strong correlation, the second a weak one, and the third 
a medium strength correlation, while the negative sign indicates the trend of the variable in 
the opposite direction: a small number of procedures is correlated with a larger CPI index, 
which shows a small perception of corruption. When the relation between number of days 
and CPI2005 is considered, then the coefficient of correlation for the EU-14 comes to -0.57, 
and for the transition countries the prefix is positive and comes to 0.48. The positive sign 
means that in the transitional countries a larger number of days is correlated with a small-
er perception of corruption. The coefficients for the EU 14 bear out the previous results: a 
larger number of days and procedures necessary to start a firm is linked with greater cor-
ruption. Why does this not hold true for the transition countries as well?
32 In this they wanted to show that countries do not have fewer administrative obstacles because they are rich 
and have more developed markets and less need for regulation.
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Table 1 Starting a business and the corruption perception index (CPI)




Cost in terms 
of % GNI per 
capita
CPI2005
Austria 9 29 5.7 8.7
Belgium 4 34 11.1 7.0
Denmark 3 5 0 9.5
Finland 3 14 1.2 9.6
France 7 8 1.2 7.5
Germany 9 24 4.7 8.2
Greece 13 49 24.6 4.3
Holland 7 11 13.0 8.6
Ireland 4 24 5.3 7.4
Italy 9 13 15.7 5.0
Portugal 11 54 13.4 6.5
Spain 10 47 16.5 7.0
Sweden 3 16 0.7 9.2
United Kingdom 6 18 0.7 8.6
EU-14 average 7 25 8.1 7.7
Bulgaria 11 32 9.6 4.0
Croatia 12 49 13.4 3.4
Czech Republic 10 40 9.5 4.3
Estonia 6 35 6.2 6.4
Hungary 6 38 22.4 5.0
Latvia 7 18 4.2 4.2
Lithuania 8 26 3.3 4.8
Poland 10 31 22.2 3.4
Romania 5 11 5.3 3.0
Slovakia 9 25 5.1 4.3
Slovenia 9 60 10.1 6.1
Eleven transition countries 
average
8 33 10.1 4.4
Note: World Bank data relate to the beginning of 2005. The CPI ranges from 0 (total corruption) 
to 10 (no corruption at all). The results of the CPI are drawn up on the basis of a total of 18 investiga-
tions carried out by independent foreign institutions, and the respondents were mainly business peo-
ple and analysts.
Source: World Bank (2005b) and Transparency International Hrvatska (2005)
Probably part of the answer to this question derives from the fact that the number of 
days indicator relates to the minimum number of days required to start a firm, and not the 
real number of days. Inclusion of bureaucratic delays would certainly change the results, 
but unfortunately we are not yet able to check this out since there are no suitable data. 
The second reason is that in the transition countries bribes are perhaps not so much nec-
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essary for the acceleration of the incorporation and registration procedure as for winning 
certain advantages during incorporation and for certain investors to be put into an unjus-
tifiably more favourable position. The third hypothesis is that the results would be differ-
ent if the time necessary for entry into the land register were taken into account, for this 
is not included in the registration process; the same would probably also hold if the time 
necessary for infrastructure connections to be obtained.
What can be concluded from the econometric analyses carried out in this paper? The 
institutional shortcomings have had an effect on the current level of real GDP in Croatia, 
and also faster and more effective changes in governance would certainly contribute to 
economic growth in the future. This particularly holds good for the reform of justice and 
the civil service, for fighting corruption as well as for strengthening the democratic mech-
anisms for controlling those in whom political power is vested. Such a conclusion might 
seem to be insufficiently founded, because, primarily, of the many econometric limita-
tions, particularly those related to governance as an exogenous variable. However, most 
of the research carried out to date on the topic of institutions and growth shows that the 
influence from institutions on growth is stronger than the other way round. So that every-
thing should not be left at possibly unconvincing econometric evidence, on the theory of 
growth that is not well enough worked out, on dubious facts of the transition and the opin-
ions of two scientists from the area of economic history (Jones and North), in the sequel 
we shall give a brief commentary on the changes of the quality of governance in Croatia. 
This is the last attempt to providing convincing arguments that institutions have had and 
still have an important role in economic growth in Croatia, this time, however, with the 
accent placed on those by whom they are created.
4 Changes in the quality of governance in Croatia
The problems of the Croatian justice system and the public administration have al-
ready been identified (see for example Ott, 2004) and are known to those in power (see 
for example Vlada RH, 2003). Clearly, in terms of an environment providing incentives 
for investment into physical and human capital and into innovations, Croatia is well be-
hind the countries of the EU, or in other words, it is approximately in the same group as 
Bulgaria and Romania. In this paper, this can be seen from the indicators for the rule of 
law, indicators of the diffusion of corruption and the administrative hurdles to the start-
ing of a corporate enterprise.33 What is less discussed, however, is the speed with which 
changes in the quality of governance in Croatia are arrived at and the nature of these 
changes. 
Very likely the first objection that the informed reader might make relates to admin-
istrative obstacles and the question expected would be: Well, what about hitro.hr?34 The 
first improvements or simplifications in the incorporation and registration procedure in 
Croatia started happening as late as 2001. At that time a special working group for the 
33 For a detailed comparison of Croatia with the EU average and with Bulgaria and Romania (over time), on the 
basis of different indicators of governance quality, see Bađun, (2004).
34 This is the one-stop-shop, via which four steps would have to be taken to start a limited liability company, 
the whole procedure lasting 15 days.
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obviation of administrative obstacles was set up; however, the results of its work were 
practically imperceptible to investors. In 2002 the Government committed itself to mak-
ing the registration procedure last not more than 30 days, but this measure was stillborn 
because it would have been necessary previously to have carried out the computerisation 
of the commercial courts and to have put the land registers in order. In 2003, the Gov-
ernment announced the formation of a one-stop-shop, which was put into practice only 
in May 2005 (hitro.hr). In the meantime, the problem of the overloading of the commer-
cial courts has not been settled, and so the question necessarily arises as to the effective-
ness of this new service. Furthermore, it will be available only in the large cities, and the 
problems that exist in smaller and outlying towns will remain, and it is actually local civil 
servants that improvise too much, that is, they have too much space of the free interpre-
tation of the regulations (FIAS, 2001).
Corruption is intimately connected with the ability of civil servants to act according 
to discretionary principles. Up to 2000, those in whom power was vested in Croatia did 
not undertake any active measures for the suppression of corruption. Since that time, the 
National Programme for the Fight Against Corruption (NN 34/02) has been adopted, the 
Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime – known as USKOK has 
been founded (NN 88/01), the Prevention of Conflict of Interest in the Performance of 
Public Office Law has been passed (NN 163/03), the Right to Access to Information Law 
has been passed (NN 172/03) and anti-corruption conventions have been ratified. The ex-
istence of these necessary laws and the involvement of the international community stirs 
optimism about the suppression of corruption in Croatia. However, very few of the indict-
ments filed for corruption have actually ended in guilty verdicts, and the number of con-
victions attended by terms of imprisonment as a result of the work of USKOK is practi-
cally negligible.35 And it is certainly widely at odds with public perception of the extent 
of corruption in the country: 55% of respondents think it very widely developed, 34% de-
veloped (Transparency International Hrvatska, 2005). Also indicative is the Corruption 
Perception Index (Transparency International Hrvatska, 2005) which has been constant-
ly on the decline since 2001, which means that business people and analysts perceive no 
positive movements in the fight against corruption in Croatia.36 
Thus, a large part of the problem lies in the application of the actual laws. For in-
stance, although there is a Right to Access Information law, there are very frequent com-
plaints from journalists that civil servants thwart any access to this information.37 How-
35 USKOK on the whole deals with procedures against ordinary members of the public for some negligible act 
of bribery. Its applications for investigations to be opened against well-known political and judicial officials were 
rejected by the Supreme Court. So far experience shows that USKOK works in an inimical atmosphere and in a sur-
rounding in which it cannot operate (Kregar, 2004). Its inefficiency should be ascribed not so much to its weakness 
as to the power of the individuals and interest groups against which it is fighting.
36 It is interesting to see that the annual rates of growth of p.c. GDP for Croatia from 2002 to 2004 fell from 5 to 
4 and 2% (World Bank, 2005). At the same time the CPI for Romania improved, and the rates of growth from 2002 to 
2004 were 6, 5 and 8%. These numbers suggest that the results of econometric analysis carried out in this work would 
probably not change substantially even if data for p.c. GDP in international 1990 dollars did exist up to 2004.
37 Transparency International Hrvatska (2005a) send 200 questionnaires to governmental bodies during August 
and September with a response rate of 56%, which is cause for concern for the Law had been in force since Octo-
ber 2003.
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ever, there is also still room for new laws (there is no, for instance, financing of political 
parties law)38 and sometimes the substance of the current laws is quite dubious. Thus the 
Prevention of Conflict of Interests Law passed in 2003 has already undergone two revi-
sions, in which the circle of relevant officials has been enlarged, the problem of appoint-
ing officials to supervisory boards of companies has remained, and an article has been in-
troduced that says “In the evaluation of the existence of a conflict of interest, special ac-
count will be taken of the nature of the office that the official holds”; nothing can justify 
the existence of such an article. A second example is the Law concerning the Procedure 
for the Transference of Government (NN 94/04), which is not precise enough and does 
not cover the local level, thus exacerbating the already high degree of politicisation of the 
Croatian public administration (Koprić, 2001).
It is hard to say whether in Croatia it is senior or lower level public servants that rep-
resent a greater problem of corruption; however, probably the first group has a more de-
structive effect on economic growth. This concerns the procedures of individuals, groups 
and firms that, working for their own advantage, influence the framing of laws, regula-
tions, verdicts and governmental measures, and in so doing provide, in a very untrans-
parent way, private benefits for the officials who help them. From the frequent changes 
in the legislative background it might be concluded that interest groups are very strong in 
Croatia and have a powerful influence on the decisions made by the politically powerful.39 
But the likelihood of there being such behaviour is greater in countries in which econom-
ic power is concentrated, in which the formal channels of political influence are undevel-
oped and in which social interests that would be opposed to such behaviour are weak, and 
all this holds good for Croatia. As for an integrated strategy for reform of the civil serv-
ice in Croatia, it is enough to say that it does not yet exist. 
All that remains is a glance at the reforms of the Croatian justice system, but before 
that it would be worthwhile quoting the views of members of the public and of investors. 
According to research into social capital in 1995, about 42% of people polled in Croatia 
had a low degree of trust in the institutions of the justice system, and 7% had absolutely 
no trust at all (Štulhofer, 2001:29). By 1999, these figures had risen to 50 and 19%. Apart 
from that, Transparency International Croatia (2005) showed that justice was the second 
priority area for the suppression of corruption. World Bank research, BEEPS40 (2002) that 
tested the views of entrepreneurs showed that the Croatian courts, in terms of corruption, 
speed of handling cases, and impartiality (or equity) were in the group of the worst-ranked 
systems considered in the work.
It is interesting that in 2002, 2003 and up to May 2004, there was no single case 
to do with corruption in the judicial system before the State Judicial Council (known 
as DSV) (Grčar, 2004). Effective control of judges and court clerks still does not exist; 
the assessment of judges by the DSV is still just words on paper. Disciplinary proce-
dures are seldom applied to officers of the court, and the penalties handed down have 
38 A possible solution is the reworking of the existing Political Parties Law (Official Gazette 76/93).
39 This is borne out by WB research (World Bank, 2004).
40 The Business Environment and Enterprise Survey. In 2002, research was carried out in 23 countries with a 
sample of 4,000 firms.
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been too few and too symbolic to work as a deterrent. As for the public perception of 
the politicisation of the Croatian courts, the problems to a great extent also derive from 
the DSV and the hiring system (for more on this see in Uzelac, 2001). For example, 
one of the criteria for the choice of judges is “demonstrated work capacities”, which 
leaves plenty of space for manipulation. In 1999, a centre for the professional train-
ing of judges and other officers of the court was founded, but only in 2003 did it start 
working, and then only partially. It is laudatory that the electronic processing of the 
land registers is under way, but this project could have started much earlier. The strat-
egy for the reform of the justice system was accepted only in 2002, and the operation-
al plan was adopted in 2003.
Unfortunately, reforms of the justice system and civil service in Croatia are only 
half-way, and the will to carry them through is questionable, which can be seen from the 
absence of any clear vision concerning reform.41 Often problems are “handled” only by 
passing new laws and/or adopting new strategies, concomitantly with the neglect of the 
fact that they are useless if they are not implemented. Then the laws are almost always 
passed in a hurry, in the urgent procedure, as it is called, and then according to the pri-
orities of politicians who endeavour to give the impression that they are active (Schön-
felder, 2004:12). Since changes in statute are frequent, this imparts additional instability 
to the operations of enterprises. 
The media are able to speed up reform processes in many political systems, but in 
situations in which officials, during for example the disclosure of cases of corruption, 
which create a great deal of public support for reform, need additional planning and con-
sultations, the process of change will be halted once more. An extra problem is that ac-
cording to freedom of the media indicators, Croatia lags behind the countries consid-
ered here (Freedom House, 2005) and that until 2000 it was considered an only partial-
ly free country – according to the respect accorded to political rights and civil liberties 
(Freedom House, 2005a). Democracy in Croatia is still not well enough developed to be 
a powerful mechanism for the control of the people in power.42
Institutions, of course, do not always have to change for the better, on the contrary, 
institutional hardening of the arteries can occur for reasons of political opportunism, but 
it is a mitigating circumstance that most of the transition countries were motivated by ex-
pected accession to the EU to carry out positive changes of institutions and increase the 
legitimacy of reforms. It is easy to arrive at institutional change when those who have the 
most to gain from the existing are forced to accept the new institutions, which happens 
on EU accession. Increased competition among candidate countries (now member coun-
tries) reduced the gain from the status quo and the possibilities for rent-seeking were re-
duced, that is, under pressure from international organisations and their own constituents, 
41 From 2002 to 2004 Croatia took only 10% of the resources that the WB had earmarked for it for the reform 
of the courts.
42 Rivera-Batiz (2002) shows that democracy affects economic growth by improving governance. He measu-
red the quality of governance (as dependent variable) as indicator that had been constructed by Hall and Jones (1999) 
and evaluated democracy by indicators for political rights of the organisation Freedom House. He also showed that 
the respect for political rights reduced corruption, hence stimulating innovation, increasing the rate of return on capi-
tal and the growth rate in a state of equilibrium.
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those in power had to prefer a policy that facilitated the accomplishment of the fundamen-
tal goal – membership in the EU (Orenstein, 2001:131).
What is common to Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania is that they had governments that 
did not from the very beginning of the nineties act pro-Europeanly, with the proviso of 
course that Croatia was also specific because of the war. Because of the delay in starting 
the association process and the postponement of the beginnings of negotiations, Croatia 
was in an thankless situation because even the exogenous factor of the EU began to lose 
its influence. Problems can arise precisely when the inhabitants of a given country think 
that the institutions of the EU do not suit them, and they will thus not persist (Rodrik, 
2003). Although negotiations have begun, it is not known how long they will go on and 
they can even be suspended. It is positive that the EU, to do with Croatia, is particularly 
insisting on the reform of the courts and the public administration, and this should speed 
up the exit from the bad institutional imbalance in which Croatia finds itself and contrib-
ute to economic growth.
What is worth bearing in mind, however banal it might seem, is that the people ac-
tually chose those in power in Croatia to be their own representatives. The question aris-
es as to what changes there should be in the whole of Croatian society so that one small 
(elected) portion of it would on its own initiative create good formal institutions. The ex-
clusion of informal institutions from the analysis, as has been done in this paper, will prob-
ably not bring us any closer to finding an answer.
5 Conclusion 
This paper has shown that it is exceptionally important to bring the quality of gov-
ernance explicitly into the debate on economic growth in Croatia. Evidence for this has 
been found in the new theory of economic growth, in existing empirical investigations 
into growth, an econometric (panel) analysis of governance and economic growth in a 
sample of EU countries and three candidate countries (including Croatia and an analysis 
of the speed of changes in the quality of the Croatian courts and civil service, as well as 
by a consideration of the nature of these changes.
If in some country there are no effective control mechanisms over the work of gov-
ernment officials and lower members of the civil service (a low level of the rule of law, 
inadequate media freedom, failure to respect political rights and civil liberties), if politi-
cisation and corruption are widely diffused in the civil service and the courts, and if the 
degree of bureaucratisation is high, then this shows that the state is using power more 
negatively for the shaping of the institutional environment. These criteria hold true for 
Croatia, and it follows that those in whom political power is vested in Croatia are more 
concentrated on rent-seeking than the EU average. Institutional shortcomings have im-
pacted the current level of real per capita GDP in Croatia, and more rapid and effective 
reforms of the judicial system and the public administration, as well as the suppression 
of corruption and beefing up democracy would have a positive effect on future economic 
growth. Since the likelihood of some endogenous revolution in Croatia is very small, the 
expected entry into the EU is an important factor that should help to bring about positive 
changes in the quality of governance. This paper has in no way wanted to say that eco-
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nomic policy is unimportant, but that there are priorities, the most important of which is 
the rule of law. This is not a new claim, and it has existed at least since Adam Smith, but 
it occasionally tends to be overlooked.
Science is still only at the beginning of incorporating institutions into the theory of 
growth. Although in this paper we have endeavoured to contribute to the debate on the 
link between governance and economic growth, there are many issues of an empirical and 
theoretical still remaining to be investigated. The main unsettled question is how produc-
tive institutions (i.e. favouring growth) come into existence, or what hidden variables there 
are behind them. How should one react to the fact that institutions crated a century ago 
can affect the current level of GDP? What is the interaction between formal and informal 
institutions? What leads to the point at which governance sets out on a new course? How 
are good rulers created? How can balance be created within, as distinct from order being 
forced on the society from outside? As always happens, the most interesting questions re-
main unanswered and are left for future research. Perhaps indeed a great deal in econom-
ic growth does depend on luck; but researchers find this hard to accept.
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ANNEX
Results of econometric analysis: real per capita GDP (PPP) and the rule of law
Table I The whole sample
Dependent variable: dlog (GDP)
Method: GLS (weighted least squares method)
Number of data groups: 4 (95/96, 97/98, 99/00, 01/02)
Number of observations included: 3
Number of countries: 25 (EU-14 + 11 transition countries)
Balanced sample
Total number of panel-observations: 75
t-statistics and standard error are heteroskedastically consistent according to White
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Table II EU-14
Dependent variable: dlog (BDP)
Method: GLS (weighted least squares method) 
Number of data groups: 4 (95/96, 97/98, 99/00, 01/02)
Number of observations included: 3
Number of countries: 14 (EU-14)
Balanced sample
Total number of panel-observations: 42
t-statistic and standard error are heteroskedastically consistent according to White.
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Table III Transition Countires
Dependent variable: dlog (BDP)
Method: GLS (weighted least squares method) 
Number of data groups: 4 (95/96, 97/98, 99/00, 01/02)
Number of observations included: 3
Number of countries: 11 (transition countries)
Balanced sample
Total number of panel-observations: 33
t-statistic and standard error are heteroskedastically consistent according to White.
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Results of econometric analysis: real p.c. GDP (PPP) and extent of corruption
Table IV The whole sample
Dependent variable: dlog (BDP)
Method: GLS (weighted least squares method)
Number of data groups: 4 (95/96, 97/98, 99/00, 01/02)
Number of observations included: 3
Number of countries: 25 (EU-14 + 11 transition countries)
Balanced sample
Total number of panel-observations: 75
t-statistic and standard error are heteroskedastically consistent according to White.
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Table V EU-14
Dependent variable: dlog (BDP)
Method: GLS (weighted least squares method) 
Number of data groups: 4 (95/96, 97/98, 99/00, 01/02)
Number of observations included: 3
Number of countries: 14 (EU-14)
Balanced sample
Total number of panel-observations: 42
t-statistic and standard error are heteroskedastically consistent according to White.
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Table VI Transition Countries
Dependent variable: dlog (BDP)
Method: GLS (weighted least squares method) 
Number of data groups: 4 (95/96, 97/98, 99/00, 01/02)
Number of observations included: 3
Number of countries: 11 (transition countries)
Balanced sample
Total number of panel-observations: 33
t-statistic and standard error are heteroskedastically consistent according to White.









































Table VII Sources of data





Rule of law World Bank, 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf
Spread of corruption World Bank, 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf
Starting a company World Bank, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/StartingBusiness/
CompareAll.aspx
Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI)
Transparency International, 
http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi
